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Our review o( ultimatum bargaining experiments concentrates on studies in
which the author was actively involved. The basic game situation is either the
ultimatum game or multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. We outline a behavioral
ti~eory of ultimatum bargaining based on a dynamic reasoning process. The stages
o( this process specify either an intention generator and its corresponding inten-
tion filter or, as the final step, an ex post-evaluation of the actual behavior. In
our concluding remarks the merits of behavioral tbeories versus rational choice-
explanations are elaborated.
'Mailing addrese: P.O. Box 11 13 32 (Fach 8l), D-8000 Frankfurt~M., Germany. This author
gratefully acknowledgea the generous Alexander von Aumboldt-award via the Dutch Science Foundation
(NWO) which made his stay at CentER possible.1
I Introduction
We review results of ultimatum bargaining experiments where we distinguish between
the simple ultimatum game and multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. ln the ultimatum
game a positive monetary amount, the "cake," can be distributed by one party proposing
an ultimatum, i.e. the other party can either accept the proposed distribution or there is
no agreement at all. The game theoretic solution therefore assigns nearly all the cake to
the proposer. Experimental studies did not support this prediction what inspired a lively
and still ongoing debate about the predictive role of game theory and, more specifically,
about how fairness considerations influence decision behavior. It is discussed how later
experimental studies may help to decide between competing hypotheses.
In multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining a rejection implies conflict only íf the last of
finitely many possible bargaining rounds has been reached. In earlier rounds a rejection
of a proposal only means that the next round is reached. The cake siZe, the monetary
amount which can be allocated among the two parties, will typically depend on the round
during which an agreement has been reached. If, due to discounting the cake decreases
over time, we speak of a shrinking cake. Most experimental studies which we discuss rely
on a shrinking cake and on parties taking turns in being the proposer and the responder.
Whereas the first study claimed that at least experienced decision makers behave like
gamesmen, later studies questioned this conclusion.
Wc Lh~~n outline a b~havioral theory of ult.imatum bargaining which assumes a dy-
namic decision process of finitely many stages. Each stage consists of an intention gener-
ator whose result is a behavioral intention, i.e. a potential decision, and of an intention
filter, i.e. an acceptability test of the behavioral intention. Whereas earlier stages rely on
rather simple considerations which may neglect nearly all strategically relevant aspects,
later stagPS rnay involve more sophisticated considerations which, however, always have
to be in line with the cognitive and analytical abilities of human decision makers. 'Che
(inal step is an ex post-evaluation of the actual behavior.
Whereas unexperienced decision makers start with the basic decision stages which
often determine also their decision behavior, more experienced decision makers may pro-2
ceed to later stages of the dynamic decision process and therefore choose a behavior
relying on more sophisticated considerations. We specify an intuitive hierarchy of inten-
tion generators and intention filters for ultimatum bargaining which can explain moat of
the previously discussed experimental results.
Our conclusions focus on the ongoing debate between rational choice explanations and
more psychologically oriented behavioral approaches like the dynamic decision process
mentioned above. Rational choice explanations often resemble a neo-classical repair
shop which specifies the corresponding optimisation task after observing behavior. Of
course, also behavioral approaches suffer from an ad hoc-nature: Since up to now there
is no general and commonly accepted theory of boundedly rational decision behavior,
behavioral theories usually are only applicable to very special classes of situations like our
simple dynamic decision model which has been especially designed to explain ultimatum
bargaining behavior.
There are too many experimental studies to give a complete overview (see the surveys
by Guth and Tietz, 1990, Ochs and Roth, 1989, and Roth, 1992, which are already
outdated or incomplete). Our discussion is strongly biased since it concentrates on the
research interests of the author and on experimental studies in which he has been actively
involved. This is why we only claim to give a personal review of ultimatum bargaining
experiments.
II The ultimatum game
When bemrning acqnainted with experimental economics and rnore specifically with
experimental studies of bargaining in the seventies and considering whether to engage
too and if wlrat to iuvc~Ligatc~, my rnain motivation was Lo avoid the very cornplex
situations for which a certain behavior can be justified by many possible explanations.
Of course, for practical advice it may be unavoidable to analyse complex bargaining
situations in the laboratory. But for developing a behavioral theory of bargaining it
scrmed morc proruising to start from scratch, i.c. to begin with thc most basic problcm
and to gradually and carefully enrich its complexity.3
If this is the basic program, it would have been even more consequential to start with
simple decision problems where no social interactioa takes place. To do so would have
required more familiarity with (cognitive and decision) psychology. For somebody with
a background in game theory it seemed better to truat in scientific labor division and
concentrate on the most basic bargaining problems, e.g. the ultimatum game.
This may sound like a great design of future acientific work. Actually what I described
abovc was only a vague intention in the senae of "If I atudy bargaining experimentally,
1 prefer to start from scratch." [ may, furthermore, have never stacted at all if there
would not have been the continuing advice by Reinhard Selten who predicted that the
ultimatum game will receive a lot of attention. Another German colleague is also guilty
of pushing me to perform experiments: In 1977 Wulf Albers assigned me one thou-
sand German Mark (DM 1.000), provided by the University of Augsburg, to control the
motivation of participants in my experiments by monetary incentives.
Consider two parties X and Y who can distribute a positive amount of money, e.g.
120 Dutch guilders (J 120), which we, in general, denote by c. We refer to c as to the
"cake" which X and Y can "eat." The distribution of c is determined via an ultimatum
of X as follows: X determines a demand x with 0 C x C c for himself which Y can either
accept or reject. If Y accepts, X receives x and Y the residual amount y(x) - c- x. If
not, both parties receive no payment at all. This ends the game.
When Y is purely guided by monetary incentives, he clearly must accept all ultimatum
proposals x since y(x) is positive because of x G c. Thus X's optimal demand ís x' - c-c
whorc c(1 0) is thi, smallisL n~onctary unit, c.g. c- j L 'I'hus Lhc gamc theorctic
solntion of Lhe ultimatum game predicts that X asks for c- c and that Y will accept
every ultimatum. Actually this behavior is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
the ultimatum gamc.
In an ever simpler situation the proposer X can select only between two proposals,
e.g. an extreme one like x - c- E and x- c~2. Guth, Ockenfels, and Wendel (1992)
have performed experiments of such situations where the responder Y could only refute
the greedy proposal. Here we will not discuss situations which are ever simpler than the
ultimatum gamc.4
Imagine an ultimatum game with c- j 120: Would you really dare to demand j 119
for yourself? Very few participants do and those who dare to do so fail nearly always, i.e.
their proposal is rejected. This was shown by the first experimental study of the ulti-
matum game (Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982) and additionally validated by
numerous subsequent studies, e.g. Guth and Tietz, 1985, and 1988, Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler, 1986, Prasnikar and Roth, 1989, Bolton, 1991, Harrison and McCabe, 1992,
Guth, Ockenfels, and Tietz, 1992, Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1992 or the
more psychologically motivated investigations of Kravitz and Gunto, 1992, Eckel and
Grossman, 1992, Oppewal and Tougareva, 1992. The main tendencies observed were
that responders are willing to sacrifice substantial amounts to punish a greedy proposer
and that this is well anticipated by most proposers who, in average, ask only for 1~3 of
the cake.
Given thc fact that responders Y sacrifice substantial amounts to punish a greedy
proposer, the average proposal behavior is easy to justify (this is elaborated in more
detail by Harrison and McCabe, 1992, as well as by Prasnikar and Roth, 1989). What
has to be explained is therefore why responders refuse proposals although they assign
significant amounts to them (see Table 1 in Guth and Tietz, 1990, which contains a case
where a proposal x with y(x) - DM19 was rejected). Clearly, this cannot be explained
by monetary incentives. This makes it understandable why a discussion about fairness
versus gamesmanship resulted.
A weakness of most experiments is that positions are allocated by chance. Participants
who received their position in such a way may not feel entitled to exploit its strategic
possibilities. fn order to induce entitlement Giith and Tietz (1985 and 1988) auctioned
Lhe positiuus of X and Y' for re~lat,ively large cakes (e.g. for c- Dh1100). An auctiou
winner earned what he received in ultimatum bargaining minus his position price. Since
such a difference can be negative, e.g. in case of conflict, we sometimes had to collect
subst.antial amouut.s. In avoragi, Lhr position pricc of a was Lwic-~, as high as thc onc
of Y. The average demanded quota x~c was 2~3, i.e. entitlement does not improve
the predictive power of the game theoretic solution. When entitlement was provided
in this way we, however, never encountered an equal split. Thus neither fairness norgamesmanship alone can explain the observed behavior.
The experiment of Guth, Ockenfels, and Tietz (1992) tried to provide the moat fa-
vorable conditions for the game theoretic solution. The idea was to support its extreme
allocation result also by fairness consíderations, more specifically to justify it as an equal
split. In addition to what party Y earned in the ultimatum game Y received a transfer
payment t which did not depend on what happena in the ultimatum game. To guarantee
entitlenrent positions were auctioned.
Clearly, for t- c game theory predicts essentially an equal split: X earns c- e in the
ultimatum game, Y altogether c~ e; c as his transïer income and E from the ultimatum
game. The experimental design relied on t- 0 and t- c and on three different cake
sizes (r. - DM18,DM32,andDM54). In average, the sum of the bids is far less than
c t t what could be justified by the relative frequency of conflict (240l0). In aummary,
greedy proposers were punished as in usual ultimatum experiments and, although thc
average demanded quota x~c was significantly higher for t- c than for t- 0, it was
invariantly far below the extreme value of 1, predicted by game theory.
I~~i lo nuw I'rasnikar and Rot.h (19R9) scrmv to hc~ thr, only sl.ndy whinc ~ ould induc~r
a game theoretic type of behavior: 10 participants were asked to submit the minimum
level ~ for acceptance in the sense that all proposals x with y(x) - c- x ~ r~ will be
accepted. As on a Bertrand-oligopoly market the participant with the lowest acceptance
level became party Y which was committed to its chosen level t~ in the resulting ulti-
matum game. At least with experienced participants competition drives down t~ to its
competitive level of 0, i.e. fairness is only one of several competing motivational forces.
Ifaving learned that fairness matters but that it is only one of several competing in-
centives oue naturally encounters thc problem to elaborate the notion of fairness and to
investigate who of the strategically interacting parties is motivated by fairness considera-
tions. Guth et aL {19R2) have tried already to investigate whether different participants
rcly on di(fc~rcnL focal dist.ributions whcn playing the ultin~atum gamc. F.arh participant
played two ulf.iinatum ganu~s with differenL op~Mnents, one as party X and onr` as party
Y (see also Table 3 of Guth and Tietz, 1990). As party Y they simply had to determine
thc ~ninininni ac'c'c~pt.ancc~ Icvc~l ~, introducc~d alxivc~. Siniilar obsc~rvations wc~ro elic~itodby Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). Exactly 15 of 37 participants relied on a
focal point in the sense of x f r~ - c, i.e. the demand x as party X and the minimum
acceptance level ~ as party Y add up to the cake c. In 7 of the 15 cases this was the
oqual split., LP. T - C,2 - 1~. CIP.arly, dlÍferent fofAl pomt9 f.an Cxplaln why conflict re-
sults. Other participants (17 out of 37) leave more to party Y than their own minimum
acceptance Icvcl ~. 5 participants left less than their own level r~ to party Y, i.e. they
must considcr themselves as being exceptionally tough.
G uth and van Damme (1993 ) make a more systematic attempt to explore the notion of
fairness and to investigate who of the interacting parties is actually trying to achieve fair
results: Are, for instance, proposers intrinsically motivated by fairness or do they only
refrain from greedy proposals since they fear a rejection? Similarly, one can ask whether
responders reject profitable proposals since they are frustrated how little they get in
comparison to Y or whether they are guided by general norms of fairness, regardless of
their own share.
In the experiments, performed by Guth and van Damme (1993), each ultimatum game
involved three parties: Party X could propose a distribution (x, y, z) with x, y, z~ 5
and x f y f z- 120 of altogether 120 points which represented a cake of f 12,- or j 24,-.
As bcfom :r is what X dernands for himself whereas y and z are what hc assigns to his
partners }' and 7., respectively; and as before Y has to accept the proposal to induce
such an allocation result (if Y rejects, all parties receive nothing). There was, however,
an important systematic variation: When deciding whether to accept or not, responder
Y~ knew the whole proposal (x, y, z) only in the xyz-condition whereas he knew only y
or z in condition y, respectively z.
Clearly, such a design allows to answer the questions raised ahr,ve: If, for instance,
X is intrinsically motivated by fairness, he should assign a significant amount y to Y
in condition z and similarly a significant share z to Z in condition y. Responders Y
who do not care only for their own share y should reject proposals (x, y, z) with low z-
assignments. There are additional questions related to this experimental design: Does,
for instance, a low assignment z in condition z signal a greedy proposal? Does a high
assignment z in condition z signal a large y or will it be seen as falsely pretending7
gcncrusity?
The results of Guth and van Damme (1993) clearly reject the idea that proposers are
intrinsically motivated by fairness. Thus fairness is a social norm which yields reliable
behavioral expectations only when its compliance can be monitored. There is, further-
more, no support for the hypothesis that responders choose conflict for the sake of others
(whenever a proposal was rejected, this could be explained by its very low assignment
y). lu ~ uudition z both, i~xtn~m~ly low and high assignments z were mjected. According
to the observed behavior for condition z one should neither reveal drastic exploitation
nor pretend too much generosity. Low, but not extremely low assignments z seem to
convey the impression that also party Y can hope for something.
III Multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining
'I'he initial experiments of Guth et aL ( 1982) stimulated a lively discussion concerning
the predictive role of game theory. So Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton ( 1985) conceded
that the results for the ultimatum game itself are quite robust but claimed that in
less extreme situations behavior will be more consistent with game theory. This claim
was substantiated by the results of two period-ultimatum bargaining experiments for a
shrinking cake.
In general, multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining relies on a given number T of possible
bargaining rounds and on a given cake size c~ for every possible round t - 1, ... , T.
'1'he monetary amouut ci can be distributed if the parties reach an agreement in period
l. IC c~t~ C ci for t- 1,...,T - 1, one speaks of a ahrinking cake. In every round l
first the proposer determines his demand xi with 0 C x~ C ci which the responder can
accept or reject. Acceptance implies that the proposer receives xi and the responder
yi(zi) - ci - r~. l3ut unlike in the ultimatum game rejecting xi implies con(lict and
0-payoffs for both parties only in the last round t- T. In rounds t C T a rejection
implies that parties enter round t~ 1 with cake size citi. All the experimental studies,
performed up to now, assumed that parties take turns in being the proposer. Unlike the
bargaining model, analysed by Rubinstein (1982), experimental studies of multiperiod-8
ultimatum bargaining munt ri,ly on T C oo (Weg, R.apolrort, and I~~Ixenthal, 1990, havc
tried to approxirnate the limiting case T- oo).
In the initial study of Binmore et al. (1985) the parameters were T- 2, cr - l'1, and
c~ - ï.25. In round t- T- 2 the responder muat always accept if he is only guided
by monetary incentives. Thus xz - cz - c is the optimal demand in round 2. From this
follows that the responder in round t- 1 can reject all proposals xr with xr ~ cr - ez,
i.e. the highest demand xr which will be surely accepted in round t- 1 is xi - cr - es.
The game theoretic solution play, derived by backward induction, consists therefore of
the initial proposals xí - cr - c2 which the respondet accepts.
In both the first and second trial oï playing this game, Binmore et aL (1985) observed
an aqgmgate distribation of initial demands rr with two focal pointx, namely the cqual
split rr - cr~'l aud the game theoretic prediction xi - cr - c~, i.e. participants were
either fair or gamesmen. Whereas in the first trial xr - cr~2 dominated x~ - cr - cz,
the opposite was true for the second trial. Because oí this reversal Binmore et al. (1985)
concluded that at least for experienced participants gamesmanship dominates fairness
considerations.
It is a convincing hypothesis that more experienced participants understand more
thoroughly the strategic aspects of a given bargaining situation and that this will inspire
attempts to exploit strategic possibilities (already in Guth et al. 1983, experienced
proposers asked for more than unexperienced ones but they were, in average, also less
successful). To demonstrate that this will, however, not bring about a game theory-like
behavior Guth and Tietz (1985 and 1986) performed a two period-ultimatum bargaining
experiment whose main difference to the study of Binmore et al. (1985) was the amount
by which the second round cake c2 shrank: In the radically shrinking cake-games es~cl
was 1~10 whereas this relation was 9~10 in the nearly no shrinking cake-games.
The evidence was convincing: The game theoretic proposal ai - ct -c~ served never as
a focal point. On the contrary, average behavior differed significantly from x~ - cl - c~,
espe~ially in th~ nearly no shrinking cake-games where hardly any proposal xr with
xl G cr~2 was observed in spite of x~ - cr~10.
The controversy inspired further experimental studies of multiperiod-ultimatum bar-9
gaining (e.g. Neelin, Somienschein, and Spiegel, 1988, Ochs and Roth, 1989, Weg et
al., 1990, Binmore, Morgan, Shaked, and Sutton, 1991). Partly these studies allowed
for more than just two rounds of bargaining, partly they represented cake shrinking via
discowit factors whicó can be differenL for the two partiea involved. lt was frequently
observed that the responder rejects a greedy proposal xi although the residual amount
ci - xi exceeds citl, the maximal future payoff. Thus also in the more general frame-
work of multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining reaponders are willing to sacrifice substantial
amounts in order to punish a greedy proposer.
If one is convinced that the desire for fairness is a strong behavioral incentive, one
naturally becomes interested in the question whether trust in fairness can assure coop-
eration in situations where, according to monetary incentives, this would be unreliable.
Giith, Ockeufels, and Wendcl (1992 and 1993) have tried to answer this yuestion empiri-
cally. More specifically, Guth, Ockenfels, and Wendel (1993) is a multiperiod-ultimatum
bargaining experiment with an increasing cake, i.e. with
OGC~ Gc~ G...GcT-i GCT.
It.s rulo,, fiu~l.hornium, alluw~~d t.h~~ prupos~~r uf ov~~ry p.,riod l- I, ...,"I', to di,clare p~riod
t as the final period, i.e. the proposal x~ could be made a real ultimatum (either the
responder accepts it or conflict with 0-payoffs for both results) or just a proposal whose
rejection leads to the next round t-~ 1 as in previous multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining
cxperiments.
Backward induction, similar to the case of a shrinking cake, yields that every ultima-
tum proposal will be accepted whereas every non-ultimatum proposal is rejected. Thus
the proposer of every round t- 1, ..., T declares period t to be the final one for reaching
an agreement and asks for x; - c.t - e. Thus both parties would reach an extremely un-
fair agreement in the first round although they could have shared a possibly much larger
cake by delaying the agreement. This illustrates why the study of Guth et al. (1993) is
closely related to the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) who investigate the
well-known centipede-game.10
The two-factorial experimental design distinguished games with T- 2 or T- 3 and
a mildly (cr~r - cr - DM3) and atrongly (ci}r - cr - DM10) increasing cake. Each
participant played the same game twice with two different opponenta but alwaya in the
same position. In 70 out of 102 plays no ultimatum was imposed in round 1: Whereas
for the mild cake increase only 28 of 50 proposers in round 1 refrained from imposing an
ultimatum, this number was 41 out of 52 for the atrong cake increase. Thus unlike game
theory's prediction behavior seems to be driven by two competing incentives, namely to
strive for efficiency by delaying the agreement and the fear of being exploited. Clearly,
striving for efficiency is strengthened by a strong periodic cake increase what ia also
demonstrated by the centipede experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in which
the cake is always doubled.
One might haveexpected that non-ultimatum proposals are more fair than ultimatum
proposals sincr a non-ultimat.um proposal smms to tell: `Look, I am not using my
ultimatum power since I believe that we both can get more by mutual trust. Why don't
we simply always try to share equally, hopefully cT, i.e. the largest cake?' Surprisingly,
ultimatum and non-ultimatum proposals of the same round are nearly identical. The
proposals become, however, significantly fairer the longer the play lasts supporting the
hypothesis that trust, revealed by not using the ultimatum power, induces fairness in
the sense oí more balanced payoff proposals.
IV Toward a behavioral theory of ultimatum bar-
gaining
My main motivation when studying ultimatum bargaining experimentally was to develop
a behavioral theory of bargaining. The lively debate what to conclude from ultimatum
bargaining oxperiments sFrmcd, howevPr, to have a different focus: Paralleling the sc~-
called Nash-program (Nash, 1953) to model bargaining as a strategic game and to deter-
mine bargaining behavior by selecting one of its equilibria (see Guth and Kalkofen, 1990,
for a more thorough discussion of Nash's program) one was very interested in experimen-
tal studies of noncooperative bargaining models like the very simple u]timatum game.li
Apparently, many scholars were ehocked when confronting some reliable evidence that
the game theoretic solution with respect to monetary incentives may have no predictive
power.
For me personally this came as a little aurprise since I considered game theory as the
theory of perfectly rational individual decision making which pays no attention at all
to the cognitive limitations of human deciaion makers and which therefore can hardly
be expected to explain human decision making. But apparently not everybody accepts
the need to supplement normative game theory by a behavioral theory of game playing.
For those who do the following rudimentary outline of a behavioral theory of ultimatum
bargaining will hopefully provide some inspiration.
Our basic assumption is that human decision making can be viewed as a dynamic
reasoning process whose various stages specify each an intention generator and a corre-
sponding intention filter. Whereas an intention generator analyses the decision problem
baeed on some boundedly rational cognitive approach, its intention filter can be described
as an acceptability test of its behavioral conclusion, i.e. of the intended behavior. Later
stages of the dynamic decision process will typically rely on more sophisticated inten-
tion generators in the sense that they require more demanding cognitive abilities. The
final step is an ex post-evaluation of the actually chosen behavior in order to enrich the
repertoire of successful behaviors on which one may want to rely later on.
Here we do not want to discuss the relative advantages of such an approach in general.
Instead we will simply illustrate how it might be specified for the context of ultimatum
bargaining and how such a behavioral theory can account for the major results of ultima-
tum bargaining experiments. Our way to model the dynamic reasoning process may be
premature although the general framework seems open to many different, more specific,
attempts. Contraty to game theory and, more generally, to neoclassical economics we
maintain, however, that human decision making is dynamic in nature and that the most
promising way to explain individual differences in behavior is to explore why different
individuals stop their reasoning process at different stages of such a process.
Individuals who are rep~atedly confronted with the same decision task, like partici-
pants cngaged in a repeated experiment, can, of courae, skip some stages o[ the dynamiclz
reasoning process when encountering the same aituation again. Experienced decision
makers typically rely on previous experiences.
Stage 0: "Guidance by past experiences~
The basic cognitive task is here to ask oneself whether one has envisaged this or a
similar decision task before. If this is true, one will ask further whether the previously
chosen behavior has been successful or not. The behavioral intention generated is then:
Repeat the previously successful mode of behavior! The obvious acceptability test for
this intention is related to questions like: Is the present problem really structurally
similar to the situation previously experienced? Are the previous experiences reliable
results or could they be simply lucky events?
For the very basic ultimatum game most people will conclude that they have expe-
rienced similar situations before. After all the ultimatum game appears at first sight
like a sirnple distribution task where both partiea ahould receive an equal ahare. The
resulting intention x - c~2 may, however, be questioned by the intention filter: Ia it
okay to ask only for a - c~2 although I as party X seem to be much more powerful?
Unexperienced decision makers will think Twhy bother?~, the same might be true for
experienced decision makers confronted with small cakes like in the study of Guth et
al. (1982). If, however, serious doubts exist whether x~2 is acceptable, the reasoning
process continues with the following.
Stage 1: "Superficial strategic analysis"
The vague intention is to ask for more than c~2. The cognitive problem to be solved
seems to be: How much can I demand without risking conflict? More specifically, one
needs an idea about the minimal acceptance level r~ of the likely responder in the eenae
that only demands x with c- x ~ y will be accepted by the responder of an ultimatum
game. 'Che intention r. - c- r~ will, however, be subjected to acceptability ti~sta like:13
Can I really be sure that the demand z- c-~ will not be rejected? If one doea not
truat in one's own prediction, one either might go back to the initial idea of x - c~2,
especially if ~- y ia relatively large, or rely on a compromiae between both aolutions,
e.g. the midway proposal x-~c -~ (all of the 17 observations with x f y C c in Guth
et al., 1982, rely on x 1~ and could therefore be explained by auch considerationa.
The few observations x" - c- E conaiatent with game theory indicate that at least a
few participants seem also to rely on another acceptability test: Can I really be sure that
ptoposals x with c- x c y are rejected? If one has serious doubts in this respect and if
c-~ is considerably amaller than c, one has to enter the next and (for the ultimatum
game) final stage of the dynamic reasoning process:
Stage 2: "Strategic backward induction"
The cognitive task is here to imagine the emotional state of a responder who ia con-
fronted with an extremely greedy proposal: Why should he sacrifice a positive amount
of money to punish the greedy proposer? Shouldn't he accept things as they are and
accept angrily what is left? From postexperimental discussions as well as from actually
observed behavior (see Table 1 in Guth and Tietz, 1990) we know that some participants
think this way. The generated intention is to ask for x- c- Ê where É must not nec-
essarily be the smallest positive monetary unit E, but a small unit compared to c. This
behavioral intention has to pass the intention filter: Does it really pay to ask for nearly
everything? Isn't there a significant risk that the responder does not accept facts as they
are and simply rcacts emotionally? In most cases this seems to prevent extremely greedy
proposals, but not always (see Table 1 of Guth and Tietz, 1990). If a participant does
not dare to ask [or x - c- È, he usually will fall back on hia previous intention x- c-~
or even on x- c~2 if ~-~ is a relatively small amount.
Up to now we have always concentrated on the dynamic reasoning procesa of a pro-
poser engaged in the ultimatum game. Since the responder is in a much more passive
situation, his cognitive task depends crucially on the proposal x which he envisages. Ií14
x is rather fair, he will happily accept the proposal. In case of a greedy proposal, in our
view this can be x - c- g as well as x - c- Ê, he will aimply have to decide to which
of the two competing forcea he yields, his desire for money or his incentive to puniah
the greedy proposer who after all would suffer a much larger monetary loss. Viewed as
a dynainic reasoning proc~s a reaponder will firat ask whether the given proposal x is
reasonably fair or not. In case of an unfair proposal he then will determine whether the
desire for revenge dominates its cost g(x) or not.
According to Tables 1 and 3 in Guth and Tietz (1990) responders can react very
differently: Proposals x, which some responders accept, are unacceptable for others, i.e.
there is usually no clearcut boundary ~ such that all responders will accept all proposala
x with c- r ?~ and reject thoee with c- x c r~ (Guth et al., 1993, have, however,
observed such a clearcut boundary ~ in a situation where this is additionally supported
by prominence considerations).
It is important that the cognitive procesa does not stop when the firat intention,
whicó has passed its acceptability test, is carried out. Since Stage 0 reflecta on previous
experiences, it is very important to check whether the actual result supports the consid-
erations by which this behavior~as been generated. If, for instance, a proposal x- c-~
is rejected, one obviously has wrongly predicted the responder's emotional state. If,
on the other hand, one would learn that far more greedy proposals were accepted, one
might correct the own beliefs concerning ~ downwards. Similarly, a proposer who has
chosen x- c~2 might think that he has made a bad choice when he learns that nearly
all "greedy proposals~ were accepted.
Thus the postdecisional evaluation will strongly depend on the information feedback
provided. There can be general feedback in experiments where participants can commu-
nicate between experimental sessions like in Guth et al. (1992), feedback concerning the
own play only as in Guth and Van Damme (1993), or nearly no feedback as in Guth et
al. (1993).
Postdecisional phenomena like postdecisional regret which appear completely nonsen-
sical in a neoclassical world can thus serve an important purpoae, namely to prepare a
repertoire of successful behaviors for future decision taska. Decision experts will usually15
have to rely on both, a rich repertoire of successful behaviors and the ability to pmceed
to later stages of the dynamic reasoning proceas if necessary.
Let us briefly indicate how the dynamic decision model could be extended to
multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining where we restrict ouraelves to ahrinking cake gamea
with ci~2 ~ ct}i for all t- 1,...,T - 1. As in the ultimatum game x~ - c~~2 will be
the first intention of unexperienced decision makers which ia then questioned by: Can't
I ask for more without risking conflict?
To generate an idea how much one can demand safely in round t- 1 is, however, lesa
obvious in multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. The resulta of Neelin et al. (1988) suggeat
that participants do not immediately rely on backward induction but restrict themselves
first of all to the following simple consideration: "If the responder rejects, the moat he
can hope for is c2. So it seems that I safely can ask for c~ - c~ which is greater than
c~~2 due to ct~2 ~ c2.~ Actually, x~ - c~ - c~ was the unambiguous and surprisingly
clearcut focal observation by Neelin et al. (1988). As clearly revealed by the reaults of
Guth and Tietz (1985 and 1986) the intention xl - c~ - c~ has, however, an important
acceptability test: [f, for instance, c~ - cz is close to cl, as in the radically shrinking cake
games, participants nearly always reject this behavioral intention, probably since they
anticipate a rejection.
Notice that xl - c~ - cZ is the game theoretic demand for T- 2. Thus the support
for the game theoretic solution claimed by Binmore et al. (1985) may be due to an
unexpected coincidence, namel,y that the eimple behavioral approach implies the same
initial proposal x~ - ct - c2 as the game theoretic solution. Whereas, however, the game
theoretic solution loses all its predictive power for T~ 2, the same is not true for the
intention xl - ct - cZ, at least if x~ - cl - cz is not an extremely greedy proposal, i.e.
if cz is a substantial amount.
V Conclusions
Since we concentrated mostly on experiments in which the author has been actively
involved, our review of ultimatum bargainíng experiments is a very personal one. AI-16
though we expect further experimental studies, e.g. by embedding ultimatum bargaining
in a richer environment like Gitth and Van Damme (1993) or by allowing for incomplete
information like Mitzkewitz and Nagel ( 1993) or Kagel, Kim and Moser ( 1992), the ex-
iating body of experimental results aeems rich enough to develop behavioral theoriea of
ultimatum bargaining based on reliable empirical facta. Hete we have outlined a aimple
dynamic deciaion model based on a hierarchy of intention generatora and their corre-
sponding intention filters which can account for moat of the more or less astoniahing
facts detected by ultimatum bargaining experiments.
The concept of a dynamic decision process provides a unique possibility to account for
individual differences in behavior which are often neglected (see Brandstátter, 1992). De-
pending on their personal experiences (see the effect of experience observed by Binmore
et al., 1985) as well as on their potentially different repertoires of analytical approaches
two different individuals can rely on different intentions and actual behavior. So the
atrategic backward induction considerations may be obvious for somebody who is an-
alytically skilful and~or has been educated correspondingly, whereas such an approach
may only be understood by others after many experiences or even never at all. Neelin et
al. (1988) have used an interesting idea to make experimental participants aware of the
backward induction solution, namely by allowing them firat to play the later stages of
a sequential game before confronting them with the more complex situation with more
decision stages. The fact that nevertheless the game theoretic backward induction solu-
tion was hardly supported could be explained in the framework of our simple dynamic
decision model since the thus derived behavior may not have passed ita acceptability test
successfully.
Experimental economics presently experiences a partly open (see, for instance, Ochs
and Roth, 1989, Guth and Tietz, 1990, or Bolton, 1991) and party hidden (by anony-
moua referee reports) debate how to explain so-called 'anomalies' (see Richard Thaler's
Anomalies in the Journal oí Economic Perspectives), i.e. empirical facts which do not
comply with optimal decision behavior according to monetary incentives. Very often this
is done by including additional argumenta of utilities (e.g. a preference for fairneas like
Ochs and Roth, 1989, or Bolton, 1991), altruism like in the context of public good provi-17
sion, or expected altruism like, for instance, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). Doubtlessly
a lot can be learned from such attempts to explain experimental phenomena, especially
when thPy are based on well accepted motivational forcee. Very often this type of re-
search resembles, however, a neoclassical repair shop in the sense that one first observes
behavior [or a certain environment and then defines a auitable optimisation or game
model which can account for what has been observed.
In my view, additional argumenta of utility functions like a desire for fairness, altruiam,
or envy, as well as specific forms of incomplete information offer no really satiafying
explanations, but shift only the problem to another level of research questions, namely
why people have such utility functions and~or beliefs. To answer such questions one
will have to rely on a preliminary analysia and evaluation of the decision problem, i.e.
one basically assumes dynamic reasoning which we prefer to model and explore in detail
instead of denying it or studying its stages separately.
Of course, the assumption of perfect individual rationality is simply wrong and can
be justified at best as an "as if"-explanation. Although we do not deny the need for
a normative theory like game theory and, more generally, neoclassical theory, we pre-
fer the natural psychological categories of human decision making over their artificial
analogues resulting when they are represented in the typical neoclassical framework of
utility maximisation based on subjective beliefs.
By experiments we can hope to distinguish between psychological ideas simply by
observing behavior and~or íts underlying reasoning process. Utilities as well as subjective
beliefs, e.g. in the form of subjective probabilities, are not directly observable: How
should they if they do not exit?! Funnily enough some psychologists seem to be excited
about the idea to explain empirica.l behavior in the necelassical way. But why shouldn't
there be a psychologist who is deeply impressed by the elegance and rigour of neoclassical
theory? After all, most economists are proud of neoclassical theory, even those who do
not believe in its predictive power.18
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